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An Empirical Model of the Medical Match†
By Nikhil Agarwal*
This paper develops a framework for estimating preferences in a  
many-to-one matching market using only observed matches. I use 
pairwise stability and a vertical preference restriction on one side 
to identify preferences on both sides of the market. Counterfactual 
simulations are used to analyze the antitrust allegation that the 
centralized medical residency match is responsible for salary 
depression. Due to residents’ willingness to pay for desirable 
programs and capacity constraints, salaries in any competitive 
equilibrium would remain, on average, at least $23,000 below the 
marginal product of labor. Therefore, the match is not the likely 
cause of low salaries. (JEL C78, I11, J31, J44, K21, L44)
Each year, the placement of about 25,000 medical residents and fellows is deter-
mined via a centralized clearinghouse known as National Residency Matching 
Program (NRMP) or “the match.” During the match, a stable matching algorithm 
uses rank order lists reported by residents and programs to assign applicants to posi-
tions. Agents on both sides of the market are heterogeneous but salaries paid by 
residency programs are not individually negotiated with residents. Therefore, pref-
erences of residents and programs, rather than prices alone, determine equilibrium 
assignments. The medical match is iconic in the stable matching literature, but with 
few exceptions this literature has been primarily theoretical.
This paper estimates the preference distribution in the market for family medicine 
residents in the United States, and empirically analyzes the antitrust allegation that 
the centralized market structure is responsible for the low salaries paid to residents. 
The plaintiffs in a 2002 lawsuit argued that the match limited the bargaining power 
of the residents because salaries are set before ranks are submitted. They reasoned 
that a “traditional market” would allow residents to use multiple offers and sal-
ary bargaining to make programs bid for their labor. Using a perfect competition 
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model as the alternative, they argued that the large salary gap between residents and 
nurse practitioners or physician assistants is a symptom of competitive restraints 
imposed by centralization. Although the lawsuit was dismissed due to a legislated 
Congressional exception, it sparked an academic debate on whether inflexibility 
results in low  salaries (Bulow and Levin 2006; Kojima 2007). Observational studies 
of medical fellowship markets do not find an association between low salaries and 
the presence of a centralized match (Niederle and Roth 2003, 2009). While these 
studies strongly suggest that the match is not the primary cause of low salaries in 
this market, they do not explain why salaries in decentralized markets may remain 
lower than the perfect competition salary benchmark suggested by the plaintiffs. I 
use a stylized theoretical model to show that residents’ willingness to pay for train-
ing at desirable programs and capacity constraints result in an “implicit tuition” that 
depresses salaries in a decentralized market.
To quantify the implicit tuition, the paper develops a framework for estimating 
preferences (market primitives) of both sides of a many-to-one two-sided match-
ing market using data only on final matches from a large market. These primitives 
are important inputs into the counterfactual analysis of government interventions or 
outcomes under alternative market designs. However, direct data on these market 
primitives is frequently not available due to confidentiality concerns as in the case 
of the NRMP, or because they are not collected in the first place. When only data 
on final matches are available, it is not immediately clear how to use these data to 
estimate the distribution of preferences. The approach may therefore be useful for 
studying other matching markets as well.
The empirical techniques in this paper require data from a large many-to-one two-
sided matching market with low frictions. The primary assumptions are that one side 
of the market has homogeneous preferences (while the other side may have hetero-
geneous preferences) and observed matches are described by a pairwise stable equi-
librium. According to this equilibrium concept, no two agents on opposite sides of 
the market prefer each other over their match partners at predetermined salary levels. 
In this empirical context, the equilibrium assumption can be justified by properties of 
the medical match (Roth and Peranson 1999). Following the discrete choice litera-
ture, I model the preferences of each side of the market over the other as a function of 
characteristics of residents and programs, some of which are not known to the econo-
metrician. I use the pure characteristics model of Berry and Pakes (2007) for the pref-
erences of residents for programs. This model allows for substantial heterogeneity in 
preferences. However, a similarly flexible model for a program’s preferences for resi-
dents raises identification issues and other methodological difficulties. In the medical 
residency market, anecdotal evidence suggests that residents are largely vertically 
differentiated in skill because medical school quality, academic record, and clinical 
performance are the main determinants of a resident’s desirability to a program. To 
account for the primary unobservables (academic record and recommendation let-
ters) and difficulties with generalizing the model, I restrict programs’ preferences 
for residents to be homogeneous while allowing for a unobservable determinant 
of resident skill. The assumption implies the existence of a unique pairwise stable 
match and a computationally tractable simulation algorithm. While restrictive, verti-
cal preferences may be a good modeling approximation in some other contexts. For 
example, colleges in many countries use a single aggregate high school exam score 
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to  determine admission eligibility. Workers differentiated by an ordinal human capi-
tal index may also reasonably approximate firm preferences in some other narrowly 
defined, high-skilled labor markets.
The empirical strategy must confront the fact that “choice sets” of agents in the 
market are not observed because they depend on the preferences of other agents 
in the market. Instead of a standard revealed preference approach, I identify the 
model using the observed assortativity between resident and program characteris-
tics (which I will refer to as “sorting patterns”) and information only available in an 
environment with many-to-one matching. Agarwal and Diamond (2014) formally 
studies nonparametric identification of a model with homogeneous preferences on 
both sides and shows that it is essential to use information in many-to-one matches. 
Intuitively, the degree of assortativity between, say, medical school prestige and 
hospital size increases with the importance of these characteristics in agent prefer-
ences. For this reason, a high weight on medical school prestige and a low weight 
on hospital size results in a similar degree of assortative matching as a high weight 
on hospital size and low weight on medical school prestige. Fortunately, data from 
many-to-one matches has additional information that assists in identification. In a 
pairwise stable match, all residents at a given program must have similar human 
capital. Otherwise, the program can likely replace the least skilled resident with a 
better resident. Because the variation in human capital within a program is low, the 
within-program variation in medical school prestige decreases with the correlation 
of human capital with medical school prestige. Note that it is only possible to cal-
culate the within-program variation in a resident characteristic if many residents are 
matched to the same program. Finally, to learn about heterogeneity in preferences, 
I use observable characteristics of one side of the market that are excluded from 
the preferences of the other side. These exclusion restrictions shift the preferences 
of, say, residents, without affecting the preferences of programs, thereby allowing 
sorting on excluded characteristics to be interpreted in terms of preferences.
I estimate the model using a simulated minimum distance estimator (McFadden 
1989; Pakes and Pollard 1989; Gouriéroux and Monfort 1997) that matches moments 
in the data to those predicted by the model, and data from the market for family 
medicine residents between 2003 and 2010. Approximately 430 programs and 3,000 
medical residents participate in this market each year. Moments used in estimation 
include summaries of the sorting patterns observed in the data and the within-pro-
gram variation in observable characteristics of the residents.
Since I will be estimating the effect of salaries on resident choices, I show how 
to correct for potential endogeneity between salaries and unobserved program 
characteristics. The technique is based on a control function approach and relies 
on the availability of an instrument that is excludable from the preferences of the 
residents (see Heckman and Robb 1985; Blundell and Powell 2003; Imbens and 
Newey 2009). This approach can be useful in other applications in education or 
labor markets where endogeneity may arise due correlation of financial aid or sala-
ries with unobserved characteristics. For this setting, I construct an instrument using 
Medicare’s reimbursement rates to competitor residency programs, which are based 
on regulations enacted in 1985. The results from the instrumented version of the 
model are imprecise but indicate that salaries are likely positively correlated with 
unobserved program quality.
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I assess the fit of the model, both in-sample and out-of-sample. The  out-of-sample 
fit uses the most recent match results, taken from the 2011–2012 market. These 
data were not accessed until estimates were obtained. The observed sorting pat-
terns for resident groups mimic those predicted by the model, both in-sample and 
 out-of sample, suggesting that the model is appropriate for counterfactuals. Further, 
Monte Carlo simulations suggest that parameter estimates important for the coun-
terfactuals in this paper are not very sensitive to moderate levels of misspecification 
in preferences and the equilibrium assumptions.
I use these estimates to study the antitrust allegation against the medical match. 
In the lawsuit, the plaintiffs used a perfect competition model to argue that resi-
dents’ salaries are lower than those paid to substitute health professionals because 
the match eliminates salary bargaining. This reasoning does not account for the 
effects of the limited supply of each type of program and resident. Capacity con-
straints at desirable residency programs due to accreditation requirements may 
lower salaries at these programs. I use a stylized model to show that when residents 
value program quality, salaries in every competitive equilibrium are below the 
benchmark level suggested by the plaintiffs. The markdown is due to an implicit 
tuition arising from residents’ willingness to pay for training at a program, and is 
in addition to any costs of training passed through to the residents. I estimate an 
average implicit tuition of at least $23,000, with larger implicit tuitions at more 
desirable programs. Although imprecisely estimated, models using salary instru-
ments estimate an average implicit tuition that is much higher: $43,000 or more. 
The results weigh against the plaintiffs’ claim that in the absence of the match, 
salaries paid to residents would be equal to the marginal product of their labor, 
close to salaries of physician assistants and nurse practitioners. At a median salary 
of $86,000, physician assistants earn approximately $40,000 more than medical 
residents. The upper-end of the estimated implicit tuition can explain this differ-
ence. The results imply that the implicit tuition would result in low salaries even 
in the absence of a match.
Related Literature.—The empirical methods in this paper contribute to the recent 
literature on estimating preference models using data from observed matches and 
pairwise stability in decentralized markets (for a survey, see Fox 2009). The major-
ity of papers focus on estimating a single aggregate surplus that is divided between 
match partners. Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2015), and Galichon and Salanié 
(2015), among others, build on the seminal work of Choo and Siow (2006) for 
studying transferable utility models of the marriage market in which agents have 
unobserved and heterogeneous preferences for partners of types known to the 
econometrician. Fox (2010) proposes a different approach for estimation, also for 
the transferable utility case, with applications in Fox and Bajari (2013), Akkus, 
Cookson, and Hortacsu (2015), among others. This approach is based on assum-
ing that the structural unobservables are such that the observed matches are more 
likely than alternatives to maximize the systematic component of the total surplus. 
Sorensen (2007) is an example that estimates a single surplus function, but in a 
non-transferable utility model. Another set of papers measures benefits of mergers 
using related cooperative solution concepts (Gordon and Knight 2009; Uetake and 
Watanabe 2012; Weese forthcoming).
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This paper estimates the distribution of preferences of each of the two sides of 
the market in a non-transferable utility model, with salary as an (potentially endog-
enous) additional characteristic that is valued by residents. Separately estimating 
the resident preference distribution is necessary for calculating the implicit tuition. 
From a methodological perspective, a primary distinction with the literature on 
transferable utility matching is in the treatment of transfers in the model. While this 
paper also allows for utility to be transferable through salaries, it models endoge-
neity through econometric correlation with unobserved characteristics rather than 
an equilibrium outcome simultaneously determined with the match. This approach 
may be better suited for environments where transfers are determined outside the 
matching process as in the medical residency market, public sector labor markets 
with salary schedules, or some higher education markets.1
Similar models, but without endogenous transfers, are estimated by Logan, Hoff, 
and Newton (2008) and Boyd et al. (2013) in decentralized markets with the goal of 
measuring preferences for various characteristics. Logan, Hoff, and Newton (2008) 
proposes a Bayesian method for estimating preference distributions in a marriage 
market with no monetary transfers. Boyd et al. (2013) uses the method of simulated 
moments to estimate the preference distribution of teachers for schools and of schools 
for teachers, arguing identification of the model by analogy to the discrete choice 
literature. An important methodological difference is that these previous papers use 
only aggregate sorting patterns in the data in their empirical approach. Two recent 
papers formally show that information available in one-to-one matches or aggregate 
sorting patterns are not sufficient to identify the preference distribution on both sides 
of the market. Agarwal and Diamond (2014) prove that even under a very restric-
tive model with no preference heterogeneity on either side of the market, sorting 
patterns alone cannot fully identify the preference parameters of the model. Under 
parametric assumptions on the preference distribution but in a model that allows for 
heterogeneity, Menzel (forthcoming) shows that only the sum of the individual sur-
plus is identified from data on one-to-one matches. Non-identification of this type 
can yield unreliable predictions for the counterfactual studied in this paper. To solve 
this problem, this paper leverages information made available through many-to-one 
matches, in addition to sorting patterns, for identifying two distributions of prefer-
ences. Agarwal and Diamond (2014) formally show nonparametric identification of 
their model using data from two-to-one matches. This paper intuitively discusses the 
importance of using information in many-to-one matches, and discusses exclusion 
restrictions useful for identifying a model with heterogeneous preferences.
The results on salary depression may also be of independent interest for its anal-
ysis of labor markets with compensating differentials, especially those with on-the-
job training. Previous theoretical work on markets with on-the-job training has used 
perfect competition models to show that salaries are reduced by the marginal cost 
of training (Rosen 1972; Becker 1975). Counterfactuals in this paper using the 
 competitive equilibrium model compute an implicit tuition, a markdown due to the 
value of training that is in addition to costs of training passed through to the resident.
1 For instance, the approach allows for college financial aid that is determined by income and demographic 
criteria as long as awards are not made in consideration of offers made to the student by other colleges. 
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Overview.—Section I describes the market for family medicine residents and the 
sorting patterns observed in the data. Sections II–VI present the empirical frame-
work used to analyze this market, the identification strategy, the method for cor-
recting potential endogeneity in salaries, the estimation approach, and parameter 
estimates, respectively. These sections omit details relevant exclusively to the appli-
cation, which is discussed in Section VII. All technical details are relegated to online 
appendices which follow the organization of the paper.
To better understand the framework in the context of the application, I briefly 
outline the approach in Section VII. The theoretical analysis uses a stylized model 
in which residents and programs are vertically differentiated to show that residents’ 
willingness to pay for desirable programs results in a markdown in salaries (the 
implicit tuition) in any competitive equilibrium (core allocations in Shapley and 
Shubik 1971). I show that the implicit tuition can be computed even when residents 
have heterogeneous preferences using estimates only of the distribution of residents’ 
willingness to pay for different programs. This calculation requires a production 
function in which residents are vertically differentiated from a program’s perspec-
tive. This restriction circumvents the need to monetize the value of a resident to a 
program in dollars.
I. Market Description and Data
The data on the family medicine residency market are taken from the 2003–2004 
to 2010–2011 waves of the National Graduate Medical Education census (GME 
census) which provides characteristics of residents linked with information about 
the program at which they are training.2 Family medicine is the second largest spe-
cialty (after internal medicine), constituting about one-eighth of all residents in the 
match.
I focus on five major types of program characteristics: the prestige/quality of the 
program as measured by National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding secured by a 
program’s major and minor medical school affiliates; the size of the primary clinical 
hospital as measured by the number of beds; the Medicare case mix index as a mea-
sure of the diagnostic mix a resident is exposed to; location characteristics such as 
the median rent in the county a program is located in and the Medicare wage index 
as a measure of local health care labor costs; and the program type indicating the 
community, university, and/or rural setting of a program.
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of programs in the market. The 
market has approximately 430 programs, each offering approximately 8 first-year 
positions. Although not reported in the table, in all but 1.5 percent of the 3,441 cases 
across program-years, a program has more than one match. Except for program 
type (community- and/or university-based), there is little annual variation in the 
 composition of programs in the market. Salaries paid to residents track inflation with 
2 I consider all non-military programs participating in the match, accredited by the Accreditation Council of 
Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) and not located in Puerto Rico. I restrict attention to residents matched with 
these programs. Detailed description of data sources and variable construction are in online Appendix A. 
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a mean of about $47,000 (in 2010 dollars) and a standard deviation of about $3,000.3 
Although not reported in the table, the salaries range from $31,000–$65,000.
The data contain information on a resident’s medical degree type, characteristics 
of graduating medical school and city of birth. Panel B in Table 1 describes the char-
acteristics of residents matching with family medicine programs. The composition 
of this side of the market has also been stable over this sample period with only 
minor annual changes. A little less than one-half of the residents in family medicine 
are graduates of MD-granting medical schools in the US. A large fraction, about 
40 percent, of residents obtained medical degrees from non-US schools while the 
3 Resident salaries after the first year are highly correlated with the first year salary with a coefficient that is close 
to 1 and a R2 of 0.8 or higher. 
Table 1—Program and Resident Characteristics
 
2010–2011
2002–2003
to 2010–2011
Panel A. Programs
Number of programs 428 3,441
Mean SD Mean SD
First year salary (2010 dollars) $47,331 $2,953 $46,394 $3,239
NIH funding (major affiliates, millions $) 88.37 92.26 88.35 91.62
NIH funding (minor affiliates, millions $) 89.90 79.85 99.04 92.46
Beds (primary institution) 421.54 284.15 418.41 273.17
Medicare case mix index (primary 
 institution)
1.61 0.23 1.57 0.22
Medicare wage index (primary institution) 1.00 0.14 1.01 0.14
Community-based program 0.25 0.43 0.33 0.47
Community-university program 0.62 0.49 0.54 0.50
University-based program 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.33
Rural program 0.15 0.35 0.14 0.35
Number of positions 7.70 2.83 7.57 2.77
Number of matches 7.36 2.93 7.01 2.92
Number of interviews 63.38 31.10 55.56 30.17
Panel B. Residents
Number of residents 3,148 24,115
Mean SD Mean SD
Allopathic/MD graduate 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.50
Osteopathic/DO graduate 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.34
Foreign medical graduate 0.39 0.49 0.41 0.49
NIH funding (MD graduates, millions $) 83.26 82.42 84.08 83.96
Median MCAT score (MD graduates) 31.24 2.25 31.31 2.20
Female 0.56 0.50 0.55 0.50
US-born foreign graduate 0.12 0.33 0.09 0.29
Rural-born resident 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30
Notes: Variable construction detailed in the online Appendix. Interviews and Medicare fields 
reported conditional on nonmissing data (less than 2 percent missing). NIH funding only for 
programs with funded affiliates. About 35 percent of the programs have no NIH funded major 
affiliates, while about 46 percent have no minor affiliates. About 8 percent of programs have 
no NIH funded medical school affiliates. A resident is considered rural born if her city of birth 
is not in an MSA (missing for about 7.3 percent of residents). Residents with missing country 
of birth (14.6 percent) are treated as not born in the United States.
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rest have US osteopathic (DO) degrees.4 One in ten US-born medical residents are 
born in rural counties.
A. The Match
A prospective medical resident begins her search for a position by gathering 
information about the academic curriculum and terms of employment (including 
salaries) at programs from various sources, such as online directories and official 
publications. The publications list the number of positions being offered by the pro-
gram as well, which is regulated by the accreditation body (ACGME). Subsequently, 
she electronically submits applications to several residency programs which then 
select a subset of applicants to interview. On average, approximately eight resi-
dents are interviewed per position (panel A of Table 1). Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that during or after interviews, informal communication channels actively operate 
allowing agents on both sides of the market to gather more information about pref-
erences. Finally, residency programs and applicants submit lists stating their prefer-
ences for their match partners. Programs do not individually negotiate salaries with 
residents during this process. The algorithm described in Roth and Peranson (1999) 
uses these rank order lists to determine the final match. The terms of participating 
in the match commit both the applicant and the program to honor this assignment. 
The algorithm itself substantially reduces incentives for residents and programs to 
rematch by producing a match in which no applicant and program pair could have 
ranked each other higher than their assignments. I refer the reader to Roth (1984); 
Roth and Xing (1994); and Roth and Peranson (1999) for a historical perspective on 
the evolution of this market.
A few positions are filled before the match begins and some positions not filled 
after the main match are offered in the “scramble.” During the scramble, residents 
and programs are informed if they were not matched in the main process and can use 
a list of unmatched agents to contract with each other.5
B. Descriptive Evidence on Sorting
The empirical strategy uses sorting patterns between resident and program char-
acteristics observed in the data and features of the many-to-one matching structure 
to infer preference parameters. I defer a discussion of summary statistics based on 
many-to-one matches to Section IIIB.
There is a significant degree of positive assortative matching between measures 
of a resident’s medical school quality and that of a program’s medical school and 
hospital affiliates. Table 2 presents regressions of a resident’s characteristic on the 
characteristics of programs with which she is matched. Programs that are associ-
ated with better NIH-funded medical schools tend to match with residents from 
4 Doctors of allopathic and osteopathic medicine have similar licenses to write prescriptions and treat patients 
but are trained in differing treatment approaches. 
5 A total of 142 positions in family medicine (approximately 5 percent) were filled through a different supple-
mentary process in 2012. The scramble was likely of a similar size in the earlier years. See Signer (2012). 
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better medical schools as well, whether the quality of a resident’s medical school is 
 measured by NIH funding, MCAT scores of matriculants, or the degree type con-
ferred by the school. This observation also holds true for programs at hospitals with 
a higher Medicare case mix index. Rent is positively associated with resident qual-
ity, potentially because cities with high rent may also be the ones that are more 
desirable to train or live in.
To highlight the geographical sorting observed in the data, Table 3 regresses 
characteristics of a resident’s matched program on her own characteristics and 
indicators of whether the program is in her state of birth or medical school state. 
Residents that match with programs in the same state as their medical school 
tend to match with less prestigious programs, as measured by the NIH funds of a 
program’s affiliates. These residents also match with programs that are at larger 
hospitals and have lower case mix indices. Column 5 shows that rural-born res-
idents are about 7 percentage points more likely to place at rural programs than 
their urban-born counterparts.
Since these patterns arise from the mutual choices of residents and programs, 
estimates from these regressions are not readily interpretable in terms of the prefer-
ence parameters of either side of the market. The next section develops a model of 
the market that uses these patterns and other features of the data to estimate prefer-
ence parameters.
Table 2—Sorting between Residents and Programs
log NIH  
fund (MD)
(1)
Median MCAT 
(MD)
(2)
 
MD degree
(3)
 
DO degree
(4)
log NIH fund (major) 0.3724*** 0.0154*** 0.0462*** 0.0025
(0.0119) (0.0007) (0.0032) (0.0022)
log NIH fund (minor) 0.1498*** 0.0084*** 0.0208*** 0.0048*
(0.0137) (0.0008) (0.0040) (0.0028)
log number beds −0.0972*** −0.0021 −0.0104 −0.0098**
(0.0221) (0.0014) (0.0064) (0.0045)
Rural program −0.0687 −0.0040 −0.0010 0.0138*
(0.0437) (0.0027) (0.0117) (0.0082)
log case-mix index 0.1894** 0.0136** 0.4670*** 0.0574***
(0.0940) (0.0058) (0.0255) (0.0179)
log first-year salary 0.0126 0.0590*** 0.3001*** 0.0969***
(0.1717) (0.0106) (0.0467) (0.0327)
log rent 0.4612*** 0.0727*** 0.1811*** −0.0012
(0.0600) (0.0037) (0.0168) (0.0118)
Observations 10,842 10,872 23,984 23,984
R 2 0.1318 0.1282 0.0381 0.0079
Notes: Linear regression of resident characteristic on matched program characteristics. Column 1 restricts to the 
residents from medical schools with positive NIH funding. Column 2 restricts to the residents institutions reporting 
MCAT scores in the medical school admission requirements in 2010–2011. All specifications include indicators for 
programs with no NIH funding at major affiliates, no NIH funding at minor affiliates, and a missing Medicare ID 
for the primary institution. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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II. A Framework for Analyzing Matching Markets
This section presents the empirical framework, treating salaries as exogenous. 
I demonstrate how an instrument can be used to correct for correlation between 
 salaries and unobserved program characteristics in Section IV.
A. Pairwise Stability
I assume that the observed matches are pairwise stable with respect to the true 
preferences of the agents, represented by  ⪰ k for a program or resident indexed by  k . 
Each market, indexed by  t , is composed of  N t residents,  i ∈   t , and  J t programs, 
j ∈   t . The data consist of the number of positions offered by program  j in each 
period, denoted  c jt , and a match, given by the function  μ t :   t →   t ∪ {0} , where 
0 denotes being unmatched. Let  μ t −1 ( j) denote the set of residents matched with 
program  j .
A pairwise stable match satisfies two properties for all agents  i and  j participating 
in market  t :
 (i) Individual Rationality
	 	 •	 	For	residents:		 μ t (i)  ⪰ i 0 .
	 	 •	 	For	programs:		|  μ t −1 (  j) | ≤  c jt and  μ t −1 (  j)  ⪰ j  μ t −1 (  j)\ {i} for all  i ∈  μ t −1 ( j) . 
Table 3—Geographical Sorting between Residents and Programs
log NIH fund
(major)
(1)
log NIH fund
(minor)
(2)
log number  
beds
(3)
log case
mix index
(4)
Rural
program
(5)
log NIH fund (MD) 0.4058*** 0.1555*** −0.0213*** −0.0002 −0.0110***
(0.0124) (0.0116) (0.0046) (0.0011) (0.0023)
log median MCAT (MD) 0.6953*** 0.4704*** 0.0830** 0.0023 −0.0877***
(0.1009) (0.0914) (0.0364) (0.0091) (0.0184)
US born (for) −0.0711* −0.1032*** −0.0025 0.0186*** 0.0141*
(0.0374) (0.0366) (0.0143) (0.0036) (0.0072)
Match in medical school state −0.4463*** −0.2646*** 0.0468*** −0.0057* 0.0111*
(0.0322) (0.0303) (0.0121) (0.0030) (0.0061)
Match in birth state −0.0038 0.0197 −0.0376*** −0.0075*** −0.0115**
(0.0285) (0.0264) (0.0105) (0.0026) (0.0053)
Rural-born resident 0.0714***
(0.0066)
Observations 15,394 13,099 24,115 23,652 24,115
R 2 0.1211 0.0299 0.0052 0.0167 0.0101
Notes: Linear regression of program characteristics on characteristics of matched residents. Column 1 restricts to 
programs with major affiliates that have positive NIH funding. Column 2 restricts to programs with a minor affili-
ate with nonzero NIH funding. Column 4 excludes programs with missing Medicare ID. All specifications include 
medical school type dummies and a dummy for residents graduating from MD medical schools without NIH fund-
ing. Column 5 includes a dummy for nonreliable city of birth information for US-born residents. Standard errors 
in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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 (ii) No Blocking: if  j  ≻ i  μ t (i) then
	 	 •	 	For	all		 i ′ ∈  μ t −1 ( j) ,  μ t −1 ( j)  ⪰ j ( μ t −1 ( j) \ { i ′ } ) ∪  {i}  . 
	 	 •	 	Further,	if	|  μ −1 ( j)  | <  c j , then  μ t −1 ( j)  ⪰ j  μ t −1 ( j) ∪  {i} . 
A pairwise stable need not exist in general or there may be multiple pairwise sta-
ble matches. The preference model described in the subsequent sections guarantees 
the existence and uniqueness of a pairwise stable match.
Individual rationality, also known as acceptability, implies that no program or res-
ident would prefer to unilaterally break a match contract. Because I do not observe 
data on unmatched residents, I assume that no program prefers keeping a position 
empty to filling it with a resident in the sample, and that all residents prefer being 
matched to being unmatched. Almost all US graduates applying to family medicine 
residencies as their primary choice are successful in matching to a family medicine 
program, and the number of unfilled positions in residency programs in this spe-
cialty is under 10 percent.6 The primary limitation of this assumption is the inability 
to consider preferences for agents not matched in the family medicine market, such 
as programs or residents in other specialties.
Under the no-blocking condition, no resident prefers a program (to her current 
match) that would prefer hiring that resident in place of a currently matched resi-
dent if the program has exhausted its capacity. If the program a resident prefers has 
unfilled positions, the program would not prefer filling a position with that resident.
Theoretical properties of the mechanism used by the NRMP guarantee that the 
final match is pairwise stable with respect to submitted rank order lists, but not nec-
essarily with respect to true preferences. Strategic ranking and interviewing, espe-
cially in the presence of incomplete information, is likely the primary threat to using 
pairwise stability in this market.7 The large number of interviews per position sug-
gests that this may not be of concern in this market, however, it may be implausible 
in some decentralized markets. Online Appendix B1 presents Monte Carlo evidence 
that suggests that the estimation procedure is not particularly sensitive to moderate 
deviations from pairwise stability.
This equilibrium concept also implicitly assumes that agents’ preferences over 
matches is determined only by their match, not by the match of other agents. This 
restriction rules out the explicit consideration of couples that participate in the match 
by listing joint preferences.8 According to data reports from the NRMP, in recent 
years, only about 1,600 out of 30,000 individuals participated in the main residency 
6 While residents may apply to many specialties in principle, data from the NRMP suggests that a typical appli-
cant applies to only one or two specialties. Greater than 95 percent of MD graduates interested in family medicine 
as their first choice, however, apply only to family medicine programs. Upward of 97 percent of residents who list a 
family medicine program as their first choice match to a family medicine program in the main match (See “Charting 
Outcomes in the Match,” NRMP 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011). 
7 The data and approach do not make a distinction for positions offered outside the match or during the scram-
ble. The no-blocking condition should be a reasonable approximation for the positions filled before the match as it 
is not incentive compatible for the agents to agree to such arrangements if either side expects a better outcome after 
the match. For the small number of residents and programs matched during the scramble, note that the residents 
(programs) should not form blocking pairs with the set of programs (residents) that they ranked in the main round. 
8 Couples can pose a threat to the existence of stable matches (Roth 1984) although results in Kojima, Pathak, 
and Roth (2013) suggest that stable matches exist in large markets if the fraction of couples is small. 
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match as part of a couple. I model all agents as single agents because data from the 
GME census does not identify an individual as part of a couple.
B. Preferences of the Residents
Following the discrete choice literature, I model the latent indirect utility rep-
resenting residents’ preferences  ⪰ i as a function  U ( z jt ,  ξ jt ,  w jt ,  β i ; θ) of observed 
program traits  z jt , the program’s salary offer  w jt , unobserved trait  ξ jt , and taste 
parameters  β i .
I use the pure characteristics demand model of Berry and Pakes (2007) for this 
indirect utility:
(1)  u ijt =  z jt   β i z +  w jt   β i w +  ξ jt  . 
In models that do not use a salary instrument, I assume that the unobserved trait 
ξ jt has a standard normal distribution that is independent of the other variables. I 
normalize the mean utility to zero for  (z, w) = 0 . The scale and location normaliza-
tions are without loss of generality. The independence of  ξ jt from  w jt is relaxed in the 
model correcting for potential endogeneity in salaries. Depending on the flexibility 
desired,  β i can be modeled as a constant, a function of observable characteristics  x i 
of a resident and/or of unobserved taste determinants  η i :
(2)  β i z =  x i  Π +  η i  . 
The taste parameters  η i are drawn from a mean-zero normal distribution with a vari-
ance that is estimated. The richest specification used in this paper allows for het-
erogeneity via normally distributed random coefficients for NIH funding at major 
affiliates, beds, and case mix index. This specification also allows for preference 
heterogeneity for rural programs based on rural or urban birth location of the res-
ident and heterogeneity in preference for programs in the resident’s birth state or 
medical school state through interaction of  x i and  z jt . These terms are included to 
account for the geographic sorting observed in the market. I do not include random 
coefficients on salaries because of the limited variation in the data, thereby restrict-
ing  β i w =  β w for all  i .
The pure characteristics model is micro-founded on residents having tastes for a 
finite set of program attributes while allowing for both unobserved heterogeneity in 
tastes and unobserved characteristics. It omits a commonly used additive  ϵ ijt term 
that is independent and identically distributed across residents, programs, and mar-
kets. I do not include both  ϵ ijt and  ξ jt because it is unclear how their distributions 
(variances) can be separately identified since aggregate demand used to invert for 
product-level unobservables in consumer models (Berry 1994; Berry, Gandhi, and 
Haile 2013) is not observed in our dataset. Given a choice between including  ϵ ijt 
and  ξ jt , I prefer an approach that includes  ξ jt for several reasons. First, product-level 
unobservables  ξ jt are important for building in endogeneity of salaries into the model 
(Berry and Haile 2014). Second, a common motivation for including  ϵ ijt has been 
that it ensures that no choice is dominated for all agents which is appealing in con-
sumer markets since dominated choices are likely to exit. This motivation does not 
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apply to matching markets since dominated choices can prevail in matching markets 
due to capacity constraints faced by more desirable agents. Third, discrete choice 
models employing  ϵ ijt implicitly assume tastes for programs through a characteristic 
space that increases in dimension with the number of programs and residents (Berry 
and Pakes 2007), which are large in this empirical setting.9
C. Preferences of the Programs
Since the value of a team of residents to a program is not observed, I model 
residency program preferences through a latent variable. A very rich specification 
creates two extreme problems. On the one hand, a pairwise stable match need not 
exist if a program’s (ordinal) preference for a given resident depends crucially on 
the other residents it hires. On the other hand, the number of stable matches can be 
exponentially large in the number of agents when programs have heterogeneous 
preferences.10 Additional hurdles include identifying a rich specification from 
observed matches alone, and computational difficulties in simulating outcomes 
using a dataset from a large market.
I use a restrictive specification for program preferences that solves the problems 
above while accounting for the primary resident characteristics that are valued by 
programs but are not observed in the dataset. My conversations with residency 
program and medical school administrators suggest that programs assess resident 
skill using test scores in medical exams, clinical performance, and the strength 
of recommendation letters. While fit in the program is considered, they broadly 
agree on resident qualifications and refer to a “pecking order” for residency slots. 
Therefore, I model a program’s preference for a resident using an ordinal human 
capital index  H ( x i ,  ε i ) that is a function of observable characteristics  x i of a resident 
and an  unobservable determinant  ε i . I use the parametric form
(3)  h i =  x i  α +  ε i ,  
where  ε i is normally distributed with a variance that depends on the type of med-
ical school a resident graduated from. For graduates of allopathic (MD) medical 
schools,  x i includes the log NIH funding and median MCAT scores of the resident’s 
medical school. Characteristics also include the medical school type for residents, 
i.e., whether a resident earned an osteopathic degree (DO) or graduated from a for-
eign medical school. I also include an indicator for whether a resident that graduated 
from a foreign medical school was born in the United States. Without loss of gen-
erality, the variance of  ε i for residents with MD degrees is normalized to  1 and the 
mean of  h at  x = 0 is normalized to zero.
9 This fact also generates computational demands for a simulation-based estimation since memory requirements 
grow with the product of the number of residents and programs. This difficulty can be avoided in demand models 
(e.g., Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995) since logit choice probabilities, conditional on simulated random coeffi-
cients, can be computed in closed form. 
10 Simulations in Roth and Peranson (1999) conducted with data reported to the NRMP suggest that multiplicity 
may not be empirically important. They find that almost all of the residents are matched to the same program across 
all of the stable matches. 
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This specification guarantees the existence and uniqueness of a stable match and 
a computationally tractable simulation algorithm that is described in Section VC. 
Existence is implied by the assumption that ordinal preferences over residents do 
not depend on the other residents hired by a program (see Roth and Sotomayor 
1992).11 Uniqueness results from the assumption that all programs have identical 
ordinal preferences (Clark 2006; Niederle and Yariv 2009; Pycia 2012).12 Finally, 
Section IIIC notes that identifying a model with heterogeneity relies on exclusion 
restrictions, in this case an observable program characteristic that is excluded from 
the preferences of the residents for programs.
From the perspective of the application studied in the paper, the assumption 
that programs have vertical preferences is essential for calculating the implicit 
tuition. As we will see, a conservative estimate of the markdown from a perfect 
competition benchmark can be computed under this assumption using an estimated 
 money-metric utility function for residents.13 One may then worry that misspecifi-
cation of program preferences in the model will cause bias in estimates of resident 
preferences. Monte Carlo exercises conducted to address this issue are discussed 
briefly in Section VIB and presented in online Appendix B1.
III. Identification
This section describes how I leverage information in the sorting patterns and 
many-to-one matching to identify preference parameters. The discussion also guides 
the choice of moments used in estimation. Standard revealed preference arguments 
do not apply because “choice-sets” of individuals are unobserved and determined in 
equilibrium. The market index  t is omitted in this section because the arguments are 
based on observing one market with many (interdependent) matches. For simplic-
ity, I also assume that the number of residents is equal to the number of residency 
positions and treat all characteristics as exogenous. Identification of the case with 
endogenous salaries is discussed in Section IV, and does not require a reconsider-
ation of arguments presented here.
A. Using Sorting Patterns: The Double-Vertical Model
Consider the simplified “double-vertical” model in which all residents agree upon 
the relative ranking of programs. In a linear parametric form for indirect utilities, 
preferences are represented with
11 This restriction may not be particularly strong because programs cannot submit ranks that depend on the rest 
of the team, indicating that incorporating such preferences was not an important design consideration in the NRMP. 
Further, this restriction on rankings that can be submitted limits the hope for identifying richer preference models 
given that the observed matches were generated using program ranks that don’t depend on the rest of the team. 
12 The ordinal preferences in the estimated model are consistent with any program-specific latent output func-
tion  F j ( h  i 1  , … ,  h  i  c j   ) from a team of residents  ( i 1 , … ,  i  c j  ) at program  j that is strictly increasing in each of its 
components. Although it allows for (limited) complementarities in this latent output, the assumption implies 
responsive ordinal preferences and hence, the existence of a many-to-one stable match (Roth and Sotomayor 1992, 
lemma 5.6). The counterfactuals in this paper will be based on the additional restriction that   F j ( h  i 1  , … ,  h  i  c j   )   
=  ∑ k=1  c j  f ( h    i k  ) , one that may not be necessary in other applications. 
13 Without the preference restriction on program preferences, it may be necessary to estimate a money-metric 
utility function for programs. This may not be feasible without further assumptions and/or data because a program 
pays each of its residents an identical salary and resident output is not observed. 
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  u j =  z j  β +  ξ j 
  h i =  x i  α +  ε i , 
where  x i and  z j are observed and  ξ j and  ε i are standard normal random variables, 
distributed independently of the observed traits. Assume the location normalizations 
E [ u j  |  z j = 0] = 0 and  E [ h i |  x i = 0] = 0 .
We first need a sign restriction on one parameter of the model to interpret sorting 
patterns in terms of preference parameters. Consider a model in which  x measures 
the prestige of a resident’s medical school and  z measures the size of the hospital 
with which a program is associated. In this example, residents from prestigious med-
ical schools sort into larger hospitals if the human capital distribution of residents 
from more prestigious medical schools is higher and hospital size is preferable. 
However, this sorting may also have been observed if these traits were undesirable 
to both sides. The observation necessitates restricting one characteristic of either 
residents or programs to be desirable. Throughout the paper, I assume that residents 
graduating from more prestigious medical schools, as measured by the NIH funding 
of the medical school, are more likely to have a higher human capital index. Under 
this sign restriction, the sorting patterns observed in column 1 of Table 2 can only 
be rationalized if a program’s desirability is positively related to the NIH funding 
of its affiliates.
Now I argue that we can determine whether two observable types are equally 
desirable. Note that the set of programs with a higher value of  zβ have a higher dis-
tribution of utility to residents, and are therefore matched with residents with higher 
human capital. Therefore, if  zβ > z ′β , the distribution of observable characteristics 
of residents matched with programs of type  z must be different than that of  z′ . The 
sorting observed in the data thus informs us whether two observable types of pro-
grams (analogously residents) are equally desirable or not. For example, assume 
that there are two types of programs, one at larger but less prestigious hospitals than 
another program at a smaller hospital. The residents matched with these two hos-
pital types have the same distribution of observable characteristics only if residents 
trade off hospital size for prestige.
Agarwal and Diamond (2014) formalizes this argument in a model with 
 nonparametric functions of  x and  z , and nonparametric distributions for the addi-
tively separable errors  ε and  ξ . They prove that sorting patterns can be used to deter-
mine if  x and  x′ (likewise,  z and  z′ ) are equally desirable, but not the distribution of 
preferences.
B. Importance of Data from Many-to-One Matches
The preceding arguments using only sorting patterns do not contain information 
on the relative importance of observables on the two sides of the market. Specifically, 
we cannot determine the extent to which unobservable characteristics such as res-
ident academic record or quality of program faculty are important in determining 
the observed matchings. To build intuition, consider an example in which  x is a 
binary indicator for a resident graduating from a prestigious medical school and  z 
is a binary indicator for a program at a large hospital. Assume that medical school 
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prestige and hospital size are desirable characteristics ( α > 0 and  β > 0 ). Sorting 
patterns from such a model can be summarized in a contingency table in which resi-
dents from prestigious medical schools are systematically more likely to match with 
programs at large hospitals. For instance, consider the following table:
  z = 1   z = 0 
  x = 1 30 percent 20 percent
  x = 0 20 percent 30 percent
These matches could result from parameters under which programs have a strong 
preference for residents from prestigious medical schools (large  α ) and residents 
have a moderate preference for large hospitals (small  β ). In this case, residents from 
more prestigious medical schools get their pick of programs, but often choose ones 
at small hospitals. On the other hand, the contingency table could have been a result 
of a strong preference for large hospitals (large  β ) but only a moderate preference 
for residents from prestigious medical schools (small  α ). There are a variety of 
intermediate cases that are indistinguishable from each other and either extreme. 
Intuitively, this ambiguity results from the ability of unobservable characteristics on 
either side to fit the observed sorting.
In addition to sorting patterns, data on many-to-one matches have information 
on the extent to which residents matched to the same program have similar charac-
teristics. In a pairwise stable match, two residents at the same program must have 
similar human capital irrespective of the program’s quality. Otherwise, either the 
program could replace the lower quality resident with a better resident, or the higher 
quality resident could find a more desirable program. Residents training at the 
same program have similar observables if  x is highly predictive of human capital.14 
Conversely, programs are not likely to match with multiple residents with similar 
observables if they placed a low weight on  x . The variation in resident observable 
characteristics within programs is therefore a signal of the information observables 
contain about the underlying human capital of residents.
This information is not available in a one-to-one matching market because sort-
ing patterns are the only feature known from the data. Agarwal and Diamond (2014) 
formally shows that having data from many-to-one matches is critical for identify-
ing the parameters of the model, and provides simulation evidence to illustrate the 
limitations of sorting patterns and the usefulness of many-to-one matching data.15
Descriptive Statistics from Many-to-One Matching.—Table 4 shows the fraction 
of variation in resident characteristics that is within a program. Notice that almost 
all of the variation in the gender of the resident is within programs. In contrast, resi-
dents are more systematically sorted into programs where other residents have more 
14 The arguments suggest that there should be a low variance in  xα , which has implications on the  within-program 
covariance between various components of  x . The moments used for estimation will use this information. I treat  x 
as a scalar in this discussion for simplicity and because the sorting patterns can be used to determine  α up to scale. 
15 In my experience, an optimization routine that did not use information from many-to-one matching had 
difficulty in converging. 
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similar academic qualifications. For instance, about 30 percent of the variation in the 
median MCAT score of the residents’ graduating medical school decomposes into 
across program variation. These summaries are consistent with academic qualifica-
tions being associated with human capital, but not resident gender. If gender were 
a strong determinant of a resident’s desirability to a program, in a double-vertical 
model, one would expect that programs would be systematically male or female 
dominated.
Table 5 presents another summary from many-to-one matching based on regress-
ing the leave-one-out mean characteristic of a resident’s peer group in a program on 
the characteristics of the resident. Let  x ̅−i, k μ be the average observable  x k of resident 
i ’s peers for a match  μ , i.e.,  x ̅−i, k μ =  1 _________  | μ −1 (μ (i) ) | − 1  ∑  i ′ ∈ μ −1 (μ (i) ) \{i}   x  i ′ , k . I estimate the equation
  x ̅−i, k μ =  x i  λ +  e i , 
where  x i is a vector of resident  i ’s observables. Each regression suggests that a resi-
dent’s characteristic is positively associated with the mean of the same characteristic 
of her peers. Viewing NIH funding, MCAT scores, and MD degree as quality indica-
tors, there is a positive association between a resident’s quality and the average qual-
ity of her peer group. Further, the moderately high R2 statistics for these regressions 
indicate that resident characteristics are more predictive of her peer groups than the 
results in Table 4 suggest. This is in part because, on average, residents that have low 
values on a given dimension should have compensating characteristics on another 
dimension. Taking the characteristics together improves the ability to predict the 
observable quality of the peer group.
C. Heterogeneity in Preferences
I now intuitively discuss the role of exclusion restrictions in learning about het-
erogeneity in preferences. These assumptions either restrict that a given agent char-
acteristic is not valued by the other side of the market, or that agents with differing 
values of that characteristic have identical preferences.
Table 4—Within-Program Variation in Resident Characteristics
Fraction of variation within program-year (percent)
log NIH fund (MD) 77.83
Median MCAT (MD) 72.09
US-born foreign graduate 79.01
Osteopathic/DO degree 85.16
Foreign degree 57.16
Allopathic/MD degree 64.81
Female 96.40
Notes: Adjusted R 2 from separate regressions of resident characteristic absorbing the pro-
gram year fixed effects. Samples for “log NIH funding (MD)” and “Median MCAT (MD)” 
are restricted to residents with nonmissing values. Regression of “US-born foreign graduates” 
restricted to graduates of foreign medical schools.
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There are two sets of potential exclusion restrictions, one for each side of the mar-
ket. I first discuss the exclusion restrictions on resident characteristics. The estimated 
model excludes the birth and medical school location of a resident from program 
preferences. Excluding the birth location, for example, implies that  conditional on 
the quality of medical school, the propensity of residents for matching to programs 
close to their birthplace can only be a result of resident preferences, not the prefer-
ences of programs. Further, residents matching close to home do so at dispropor-
tionately lower quality programs only because they trade off program quality with 
preferences for location. The principle is similar to the use of variation excluded 
from one part of a system to identify a simultaneous equation model. The exclusion 
restriction in the example above isolates a factor influencing the demand for resi-
dency positions without affecting the distribution of choice sets faced by residents. 
Since programs have homogeneous preferences in the model, a violation of this 
assumption occurs if, conditional on medical school characteristics, residents born 
in a particular state are systematically more skilled than residents born elsewhere.
The empirical specifications also exclude the determinants of human capital 
( x i ,  ϵ i ) from preferences of residents for programs. This results in choice set variation 
across residents with different skills but similar preferences. Ideally, one would be 
able to estimate a preference distribution for programs that is heterogeneous across 
residents from different medical schools or with different skill levels. Richer spec-
ifications that allow for this type of preference heterogeneity were difficult to esti-
mate, potentially because the available quality indicators of residents only include 
information on a resident’s medical school, and do not vary at the individual level.
The second set of exclusion restrictions is on program characteristics. These 
restrictions are embedded in the homogeneous preference assumption discussed 
earlier. I do not exclude any program characteristics from resident preferences.
Existing formal analyses of identification of non-transferable utility matching 
models have either assumed that preferences are homogeneous on both sides of 
Table 5—Peer Sorting
Peer log
NIH fund
(1)
Peer log
MCAT
(2)
Peer foreign
degree
(3)
Peer DO
degree
(4)
Peer MD
degree
(5)
log NIH fund (MD) 0.2919*** 0.0103*** −0.0249*** −0.0043** 0.0293***
(0.0132) (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0019) (0.0033)
log median MCAT (MD) 0.6449*** 0.0874 −0.2000*** 0.0165 0.1850***
(0.1832) (0.0750) (0.0458) (0.0247) (0.0499)
US born (for) 0.0403 0.0141 −0.1063*** 0.0394*** 0.0669***
(0.0421) (0.0103) (0.0091) (0.0050) (0.0079)
Observations 19,830 19,845 24,066 24,066 24,066
R 2 0.1280 0.6437 0.3632 0.0914 0.3197
Notes: Linear regression of average characteristics of peers on the characteristics of a resident. Column 1 restricts to 
the set of residents with at least one peer from a medical school with nonzero NIH funding. Column 2 restricts res-
idents with at least one peer from a medical school with nonmissing MCAT score. All specifications include med-
ical school type dummies and a dummy for residents from medical schools without NIH funding. Standard errors 
clustered at the program-year level in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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the market (Agarwal and Diamond 2014) or have avoided exclusion restrictions 
but obtained results on identifying only the sum of utilities in a match (Menzel 
forthcoming).
IV. Salary Endogeneity
The salary offered by a residency program may be correlated with unobserved 
program covariates, resulting in biased estimates of residents’ willingness to pay 
for programs. However, the bias cannot be signed ex ante in this setting. Programs 
with desirable unobserved traits may be able to pay lower salaries in equilibrium 
due to compensating differentials. Alternatively, desirable programs may be more 
productive or better funded, resulting in salaries that are positively associated with 
unobserved quality.
While it would be ideal to have a full model of salary setting, I avoid this for 
several reasons. First, the allegation of collusive salary setting in the lawsuit is unre-
solved. Second, hospitals tend to set identical salaries for residents in all specialties, 
suggesting that a full model should consider the joint salary setting decision across 
all residency programs at a hospital. Finally, a full model would need to account for 
accreditation requirements that require salaries to be adequate for a resident’s living 
and educational expenses.16
A. A Control Function Approach
I propose a control function correction for potential bias due to correlation 
between salaries  w jt and program unobservables  ξ jt (see Heckman and Robb 1985; 
Blundell and Powell 2003; Imbens and Newey 2009). The method uses an instru-
ment  r jt that is excluded from the utility function  U (⋅) . I describe the instrument in 
the next section.
I use a linear control function in which the salary,  w jt , is specified as
(4)  w jt =  z jt  γ +  r jt  τ +  ν jt ,  
where  z jt are program observable characteristics,  r jt is the instrument, and  ν jt is an 
unobservable. Endogeneity of  w jt is captured through correlation between the unob-
servables  ν jt and  ξ jt .
The approach requires  ( ξ jt ,  ν jt ) to be independent of  ( z jt ,  r jt ) . This assumption 
replaces the weaker conditional moment restriction needed in a linear instrumental 
variables approach.17 Under this independence, although  w jt is not (uncondition-
ally) independent of  ξ jt , it is conditionally independent of  ξ jt given  ν jt and  z jt . For 
16 The ACGME sponsoring institution requirements state that “Sponsoring and participating sites must provide 
all residents with appropriate financial support and benefits to ensure that they are able to fulfill the responsibilities 
of their educational programs.” 
17 Imbens (2007) discusses these independence assumptions, noting that they are commonly made in the control 
function literature and are often necessary when dealing with a non-additive second stage. In this context, even 
though  ξ jt is additively separable from  w jt , the approach used in demand models pioneered by Berry (1994) and 
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), where an inversion can be used to estimate a variable with a separable form, 
is not available. 
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tractability given the limited salary variation, I further model the distribution of  ξ jt 
conditional on  ν jt as
(5)  ξ jt = κ ν jt + σ  ζ jt ,  
where  ζ jt ∼ N (0, 1) is drawn independently of  ν jt and  (κ, σ) are unknown param-
eters. The specification allows the unobservable characteristic of the program  ξ jt to 
be correlated across time through  ν jt .
Given this specification, one can rewrite equation (1) as
(6)  u ijt =  z jt   β i z +  w jt   β i w + κ ν jt + σ ζ jt ,  
and normalize the scale parameter  σ to 1. Following common practice, I estimate 
equation (4) using OLS to obtain a consistent estimate of  ν jt as a conditioning vari-
able in place of its true value. Hence, we can treat it as any other observed character-
istic. Since variation in  w jt given  ν jt and  z jt is due to  r jt , the assumptions above imply 
that  ζ jt is independent of  w jt , solving the endogeneity problem.
While it may be possible to relax the linear specification in principle, an import-
ant restriction in this approach is that unobservables of competitor programs can-
not affect salaries (except through  ν jt ). Nonetheless, a linear specification has been 
shown to substantially reduce bias in estimates even in models of oligopolistic com-
petition in which the price has a nonlinear relationship with unobservables and the 
characteristics of competing products (Yang, Chen, and Allenby 2003; Petrin and 
Train 2010).
B. Instrument
Table 6 presents regression estimates of equation (4), except using a log-log spec-
ification so that coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. The first four columns 
do not include the instrument  r jt , which is defined below. Columns 1 shows limited 
correlation between salaries and observed program characteristics except rents and 
the Medicare wage index. The elasticity with respect to these two variables is small, 
at less than 0.15 in magnitude. This suggests that models that do not instrument for 
salaries may provide reasonable approximations.
To address potential correlation, however, I will also present estimates that use 
an instrument. Conversations with program directors suggest that salaries paid by 
competitors in a program’s geographic area are viewed as benchmarks for setting 
salaries in the residency market.18 Column 2 shows that lagged salaries paid by 
other hospitals in the program’s area are a significant predictor of salaries paid by 
a program, with an R2 statistic of about 0.33. The use of this benchmark suggests 
instruments based on geographic aggregates that affect salaries but are unrelated to 
resident preferences. I will construct an instrument using Medicare reimbursement 
rates for residency training at competitor hospitals.
18 The Council of Teaching Hospitals annually publishes statistics on the compensation paid to medical resi-
dents, disaggregated by geographical regions. 
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Medicare’s reimbursement to residency programs for direct costs of training is 
based on cost reports submitted in 1984. Before the prospective payment system 
was established, the total payment made to a hospital did not depend on the precise 
classification of costs as training or patient care costs. The reimbursement system 
for residency training was severed from payments for patient care in 1985 because 
the two types of costs were considered distinct by the government. While patient 
care was reimbursed based on fees for diagnosis-related groups, reimbursements for 
residency training were calculated using cost reports in a base period, usually 1984. 
Line items related to salaries and benefits, and administrative expenses of resi-
dency programs were designated as direct costs of residency training. A  per-resident 
amount was calculated by dividing the total reported costs on these line items by 
Table 6—Wage Regressions
log first year salary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log rent −0.0373** 0.0179 −0.0379** −0.0378** 0.0172 −0.0306
(0.0177) (0.0140) (0.0175) (0.0160) (0.0143) (0.0230)
Rural program 0.0065 0.0103 0.0110 0.0104 0.0103 0.0055
(0.0081) (0.0071) (0.0080) (0.0076) (0.0069) (0.0079)
log wage index 0.1366*** −0.0152 0.1182*** 0.0806*** −0.0167 0.0809***
(0.0307) (0.0262) (0.0302) (0.0287) (0.0263) (0.0290)
log NIH fund (major) 0.0024 0.0062*** 0.0023 0.0034 0.0062*** 0.0024
(0.0027) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0024)
log NIH fund (minor) −0.0060* −0.0005 −0.0047 −0.0040 −0.0005 −0.0041
(0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0031)
log number beds 0.0087* 0.0012 0.0086* 0.0064 0.0010 0.0108**
(0.0046) (0.0036) (0.0045) (0.0041) (0.0036) (0.0043)
log case-mix index −0.0108 0.0051 −0.0046 −0.0038 0.0056 −0.0065
(0.0195) (0.0151) (0.0195) (0.0190) (0.0152) (0.0191)
log competitor salary 0.8779*** 0.8651***
 (lagged) (0.0542) (0.0683)
log reimbursement 0.0227*** 0.0064 −0.0002 0.0050
(0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0063) (0.0070)
log competitor 0.0968*** 0.0090 0.0847***
 reimbursement (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0178)
Location characteristics Y
Observations 3,418 2,997 3,418 3,418 2,997 3,418
R 2 0.0452 0.3284 0.0640 0.1226 0.3294 0.1811
Notes: Regression of a program’s first year salary on program characteristics. All columns include dummy variables 
for programs with no NIH funding at major affiliates, for no NIH funding at minor affiliates, and a dummy for miss-
ing Medicare ID for the primary institution. “Competitor salary (lagged)” is the average of lagged salaries of other 
family practice residency programs in the geographic area of the program hospital. “Competitor reimbursement” 
is a weighted average of the Medicare primary care per resident amounts of institutions in the geographic area of 
a program other than the primary institutional affiliate of the program. Geographic area defined as in Medicare 
DGME payments: MSA/NECMA unless less than three competitors with available data in the area, in which case 
the census region is used. For columns 3–6, a program’s reimbursement rate is truncated at $5,000 (46 observa-
tions) and a dummy for truncated observations is estimated. Sample restricted to programs for which salary was not 
imputed as described in the online Appendix. Standard errors clustered at the program level in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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the number of residents in the base period. Today, hospitals are reimbursed based on 
this per-resident amount, adjusted for inflation using CPI for all urban consumers.
This reimbursement system therefore uses reported costs from two decades 
prior to the sample period for this study. More importantly, the per-resident amount 
may not reflect costs even in the base period because hospitals had little incen-
tive to account for costs under the correct line item. The mean reimbursement rate 
for family medicine residency programs is $71,131, with a standard deviation of 
$28,023 (in 2010 dollars). Newhouse and Wilensky (2001) argue that this variation 
in per-resident amounts is primarily driven by differences in hospital accounting 
practices rather than real costs because the distinction between patient care costs 
from those incurred due to residency training is arbitrary. In other words, whether a 
cost, say salaries paid to attending physicians, was accounted for in a line item later 
designated for direct costs can significantly influence reimbursement rates today. 
These reimbursements are earmarked for costs of residency training and are posi-
tively associated with salaries paid by a program today (column 3 of Table 6).
I instrument using a weighted average of reimbursement rates of other teaching 
hospitals in the geographic area of a program. The instrument is defined as
(7)  r j =  
 ∑ k∈ G j  f t e k × r r k   ____________  ∑ k∈ G j  ft e k 
 ,  
where  r r k and  ft e k are the reimbursement rate and number of full-time equivalent 
residents at program  k ’s primary hospital in the base period, and  G j are the hospitals 
in program  j ’s geographic area other than  j ’s primary hospital. I base the geographic 
definitions on Medicare’s physician fee schedule, i.e., the metropolitan statistical 
area (MSA) of the hospital or the rest of state if the hospital is not in an MSA. If less 
than three other competitors are in this area, define  G j to be the census division.19 
The variation in competitor reimbursement rates is significant, with a standard devi-
ation of $13,429 (in 2010 dollars).
Consistent with the theory for the instrument’s effect on salaries, column 4 shows 
that competitor reimbursements are positively related to salaries. When estimated in 
levels rather than logs, this specification represents equation (4), which is analogous 
to the first stage in a two-stage least squares method.20 In column 5, I test the the-
ory that competitor reimbursements affect salaries only through competitor salaries. 
Relative to column 4, controlling for the lagged average competitor salaries reduces 
the estimated effect of competitor reimbursements by an order of magnitude and 
results in a statistically insignificant effect.
The key assumption for validity of the instrument is that the program unobserv-
able  ξ jt is conditionally independent of competitor reimbursement rates, given pro-
gram characteristics and a program’s own reimbursement rate, which is included in 
19 Medicare’s reimbursement scheme and the construction of the instrument are detailed in online Appendix C. 
20 Figure C1 in the online Appendix depicts an increasing relationship between salary and competitor reim-
bursements. Clustered at the program level, the first stage F-statistic for the coefficient on the instrument is 37.6. 
While greater than the commonly used threshold value of 10, Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) point out that the 
cutoff is only valid for linear models. Since the control function approach is based on assuming independence, I also 
tested for heteroskedasticity in the residuals from the first stage. The hypothesis that the residuals are homoskedastic 
cannot be rejected at the 90 percent confidence level using either the tests proposed by Breusch and Pagan (1979) 
or by White (1980). 
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z jt for specifications using the instrument. This assumption is satisfied if variation in 
reimbursement rates is driven by an arbitrary classification of costs by hospitals in 
1984 or if past costs of competitors are not related to residents’ preferences during 
the sample period. The primary threat is that reimbursement rates are correlated 
with persistent geographic factors excluded from resident preferences. To some 
extent, this concern is mitigated by controlling for a program’s own reimbursement 
rate. Additionally, column 6 shows that including location characteristics such as 
median age, household income, crime rates, college population, and total popula-
tion changes the impact of competitor reimbursement rates on a program’s salary 
by less than the standard error in the estimates.21 Another concern is the possibility 
that programs respond to the reimbursement rates of competitors by engaging in 
endogenous investment. A comparison of estimates from columns 1 and 4 shows 
little evidence of sensitivity of the coefficients on observed program characteristics 
(NIH, beds, case mix index) to the inclusion of reimbursement rate variables.
V. Estimation
This section defines the estimator, the moments used, and the simulation 
technique.
A. Simulated Minimum Distance
The estimation proceeds in two stages when the control function is employed. I 
first estimate the control variable  ν jt from equation (4) using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) to construct the residual
(8)  ν ̂ jt =  w jt −  z jt   γ ̂ −  r jt   τ ̂ . 
Replacing this estimate in equation (6), we get
(9)  u ijt ≈  z ijt   β i z +  w jt   β i w + κ ν ̂ jt +  ζ jt , 
where the approximation is up to estimation error in  ν jt . The estimation of parame-
ters determining the human capital index of residents and resident preferences over 
programs proceeds by treating  ν ̂ jt like any other exogenous observable program 
characteristic. The error due to using  ν ̂ jt instead of  ν jt , however, affects the calcula-
tion of standard errors. This first stage is not necessary in the model treating salaries 
as exogenous.
The distribution of preferences of residents and human capital can be deter-
mined as a function of observable characteristics of both sides and the parameter 
21 I also directly assess whether excluded geographical aggregates of population, income, share of population 
that is college educated, age, and crime rates are strong predictors of competitor reimbursements in online Appendix 
C. Estimates in Table C1 suggest that bias due to excluding these characteristics, if any, is likely small. First, most 
of the excluded characteristics are not statistically significant. While median age and property crime rates have 
significant coefficients, their economic magnitudes are small. Second, the excluded characteristics together explain 
less than 6 percent of the variation in addition to controls already included in the model. As noted earlier, these 
characteristics don’t drive the effect of the instrument on resident salaries. 
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of the model,  θ, collected from equations (2), (3), and (6). The second stage of the 
 estimation uses a simulated minimum distance estimator (McFadden 1989; Pakes 
and Pollard 1989; Gouriéroux and Monfort 1997). The estimate  θ ˆ SMD minimizes a 
simulated criterion function
(10)  ‖ m ˆ −  m ̂ S (θ) ‖ W 2 =  ( m ̂ −  m ̂ S (θ) ) ′  W ( m ̂ −  m ̂ S (θ) ) ,  
where  m ˆ is a set of moments constructed using the matches observed in the sam-
ple,  m ˆ S (θ) is the average of moments constructed from  S simulations of matches in 
the economy. The choice of weight matrix  W , the inference procedure, the optimi-
zation algorithm, and additional details on the estimator are in online Appendix B. 
For inference, the main challenge is in dealing with interdependence in the matches. 
I use a parametric bootstrap for the moments, and a subsequent delta method to con-
struct standard errors. Finally, the choice of optimization algorithm must consider 
the fact that the simulated objective function is not smooth.
B. Moments
The vector  m ˆ consists of sample analogs of three sets of moments, calculated 
separately for each market and then averaged across markets. The simulated coun-
terparts  m ˆ S (θ) are computed identically, but averaged across the simulations and 
markets.
For the match  μ t observed in market  t , the set of moments are given by
 (i) Moments of the joint distribution of observable characteristics of residents 
and programs as given by the matches. For every pair of scalars  x  l k , i and  z  m k , jt ,
 (11)  m ˆ t, ov, k =  1 ___  N t  ∑ i∈  t  1 { μ t (i) = j}   x  l k , i  z  m k , jt .  
 (ii) The within-program variance of resident observables. For each scalar  x k, i  , 
 (12)  m ˆ t, w, k =  1 ___  N t  ∑ i∈  t  ( x k, i −  1 _________  | μ t −1 ( μ t (i) ) |   ∑  i ′ ∈ μ t −1 ( μ t (i) )    x k,  i ′  ) 
2
  . 
 (iii) The covariance between resident characteristics and the average characteris-
tics of a resident’s peers. For every pair of scalars  x  l k , i and  x  m k , i  , 
 (13)  m ˆ t, p, k =  1 ___  N t  ∑ i∈  t   x  l k , i     
1 ___________  | μ t −1 ( μ t (i) ) | − 1  ∑  i ′ ∈ μ t −1 ( μ t (i) ) \ {i}   x  m k ,  i ′   . 
The first set of moments include the covariances between program and resident 
characteristics. These moments are the basis of the regression coefficients presented 
in Tables 2 and 3. They quantify the degree of assortativity between resident and 
program characteristics observed in the data.22 The second and third set of moments 
22 I include covariances for every pair of observed resident and program characteristics. Specifications 
employing random coefficients also use the square of the corresponding program characteristic. I also include the 
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take advantage of the many-to-one matching nature of the market.23 Section IIIB 
presents summaries of these moments from the data. These moments cannot be 
constructed in one-to-one matching markets, such as the marriage market, but as 
formally discussed in Agarwal and Diamond (2014) are crucial to identify even 
the simpler double-vertical model. Since these moments extract information from 
within a peer group without reference to the program in which they are training, they 
effectively control for both observable and unobservable program characteristics.24
C. Simulating a Match
Under the parametric assumptions made on  ζ jt ,  ε i , and  η i in Section II, for a 
given parameter vector  θ , a unique pairwise stable match exists and can be simu-
lated. Because residents only participate in one market, matches in different mar-
kets can be simulated independently. For simplicity, I describe the procedure for 
only one market and omit the market subscript  t . For a draw of the unobservables 
 { ε is ,   η is } i=1 N and  { ζ js } j=1 J indexed by  s , calculate
  h is =  x i  α +  ε is , 
and the indirect utilities  { u ijs } i, j  . The indirect utilities determine the program resident 
i picks from any choice set.
Begin by sorting the residents in order of their simulated human capital 
index,  { h is } i=1 N , and let  i  (k )  be the identity of the resident with the  k th highest value.
•   Step  1: Resident  i  (1)  picks her favorite program. Set her simulated match, 
 μ s ( i  (1)  ) , to this program and compute  J  (1)  , the set of programs with unfilled 
positions after  i  (1)  is assigned.
•   Step  k > 1: Let  J  (k−1)  be the set of programs with unfilled positions after resi-
dent  i  (k−1)  has been assigned. Set  μ s ( i  (k )  ) to the program in  J  (k−1)  most desired 
by  i  (k )  .
The simulated match  μ s can be used to calculate moments using equations 
(11)–(13). The optimization routine keeps a fixed set of simulation draws of unob-
servable characteristics for computing moments at different values of  θ .
A model with preference heterogeneity on both sides requires a computationally 
more complex simulation method, such as the deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale 
and Shapley 1962), to compute a particular pairwise stable match.25
 probability that a resident is matched to a program located in the same state as her state of birth, or the same state 
as her medical school state. 
23 Alternatively, one could combine moments of type 2 and 3 to include all entries in (the upper triangular 
portion of) the within-program covariance matrix of characteristics. In estimation, the second set includes every 
resident characteristic and the third set includes all interactions. 
24 Note that the number of moments suggested increases rapidly as more characteristics are included in the 
preference models. If the covariance between each observed characteristic of the resident and of the program are 
included in the first set of moments, the number of moments is at least the product of the number of characteristics 
of each side while the number of parameters is the sum. This growth can create difficulties when estimating models 
with a very rich set of characteristics. 
25 In the deferred acceptance algorithm, each applicant simultaneously applies to her most favored program that 
has not yet rejected her. A set of applications are held at each stage while others are rejected and assignments are 
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VI. Empirical Specifications and Results
I present estimates from four models. The first model does not allow for unob-
served heterogeneity in resident preferences but allows for heterogeneity in taste 
for program location based on a resident’s birth and medical school location. The 
second model has the richest form of preferences as it allows for unobserved het-
erogeneity in preferences for diagnostic mix, research focus, and hospital size via 
normally distributed random coefficients on case mix index, NIH funds of major 
medical school affiliates, and the number of beds. The comparison allows us to 
assess robustness and the importance of unobserved preference heterogeneity. These 
two models treat salaries as exogenous. The third and the fourth models modify the 
first and second models respectively to addresses potential endogeneity in salaries 
using the instrument described in Section IVB. The last two specifications include 
a program’s own reimbursement rate in addition to characteristics included in the 
other models.
Parameter estimates for residents’ preferences for programs presented in the next 
section are translated into dollar equivalents for a select set of program character-
istics. These are the most economically relevant statistics obtained from preference 
estimates. Online Appendix D briefly discusses the underlying parameters, which 
are not economically intuitive.
A. Preference Estimates
Panels A1 and A2 of Table 7 present the estimated preference parameters for pro-
grams in salary equivalent terms. These estimates are best interpreted as describing 
the types of programs residents value, which may derive from effects on future earn-
ings or due to intrinsic preferences for the work or training environment. Panel B 
presents parameter estimates for the distribution of human capital, which determines 
ordinal rankings between residents.
Estimates without Salary Instruments.—Comparing Specifications (1) and (2), 
the estimated value of a 1 standard deviation higher case mix index at an otherwise 
identical program is about $2,500–$5,000 in annual salary for a typical resident. 
Likewise, residents are willing to pay for programs at larger hospitals as mea-
sured by beds, and for programs with higher NIH funded affiliates. The estimates 
from Specification (2) suggest a substantial degree of preference heterogeneity for 
these characteristics as well. The additional heterogeneity in preferences relative to 
Specification (1) results in a shift in the mean willingness to pay for NIH funding 
of major affiliates, the case mix index, and beds, but not whether they are desirable 
or not. The estimates also suggest that, despite the availability of an extensive set 
of program characteristics, program unobservables are significant. The willingness 
to pay for a standard deviation increase in the program unobservable has a similar 
order of magnitude as the case mix index.
made final only when no further applications are rejected. This temporary nature of held applications and the need 
to compute a preferred program for all applicants at each stage significantly increases the computational burden for 
a market with many participants such as the one studied in this paper. 
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Panel A2 presents estimates of preferences for program types and heterogene-
ity in preferences for program location. Both Specifications (1) and (2) estimate 
that, ceteris paribus, rural programs are preferable to urban programs. Although not 
Table 7—Preference Estimates
Geographic
heterogeneity
(1)
Full
heterogeneity
(2)
Geographic  
heterogeneity  
with instrument
(3)
Full heterogeneity 
with instrument
(4)
Panel A1. Preference for programs (in US$ for 1 standard deviation change)
Case mix index—coefficient 2,320.26 4,792.02 6,088.35 35,353.43
(335.74) (918.88) (1,216.81) (23,061.80)
 Sigma R.C. 4,502.71 14,336.18
(1,036.50) (10,695.10)
log NIH fund. (major)— 6,498.66 490.67 4,402.22 −1,229.79
 coefficient (672.84) (711.09) (996.46) (3,422.43)
 Sigma R.C. 5,497.70 29,159.39
(1,233.70) (19,073.86)
log beds—coefficient 3,528.07 6,899.76 8,837.08 20,438.57
(341.98) (1,245.58) (1,616.13) (13,799.62)
 Sigma R.C. 11,107.09 47,944.02
(2,073.48) (30,956.09)
log NIH fund. (minor) 5,559.78 4,993.23 7,619.88 30,385.76
(556.53) (911.30) (1,405.87) (19,747.07)
Program unobservable 2,179.23 4,329.29 5,119.97 20,068.14
(213.72) (600.79) (926.17) (12,781.22)
Panel A2. Preference for programs
Rural program 5,610.75 7,327.49 17,313.61 25,539.74
(924.59) (1,712.59) (3,547.54) (19,001.56)
University-based program 11,080.26 15,786.30 25,129.66 73,468.62
(1,482.34) (2,337.62) (5,279.00) (48,398.50)
Community/university −2,217.05 −5,000.99 −7,506.98 −34,181.16
 program (354.60) (1,039.03) (1,528.10) (22,490.08)
Medical school state 2,301.94 9,819.73 4,528.94 45,337.71
(218.21) (1,386.89) (821.05) (29,632.43)
Birth state 1,319.99 6,342.26 2,450.98 29,386.24
(128.16) (892.44) (447.97) (19,241.60)
Rural birth × rural program 108.89 1,188.76 232.98 4,984.95
(26.53) (231.92) (63.41) (3,330.26)
Panel B. Human capital
log NIH fund (MD) 0.1269 0.1153 0.0941 0.1191
(0.0139) (0.0164) (0.0131) (0.0156)
Median MCAT (MD) 0.0666 0.0814 0.0413 0.0797
(0.0038) (0.0070) (0.0030) (0.0056)
US born (foreign grad) −0.2470 0.1503 0.2927 0.2083
(0.0801) (0.1021) (0.0705) (0.0989)
Sigma (DO) 0.7944 0.8845 0.7275 0.9321
(0.0285) (0.0359) (0.0292) (0.0370)
Sigma (foreign) 3.0709 3.6190 2.8215 3.5549
(0.1102) (0.1469) (0.1131) (0.1411)
Notes: Detailed estimates in online Appendix Table D.1. Panel A1 presents the dollar equivalent for a 1 standard 
deviation change in a program characteristic. All columns include median rent in county, Medicare wage index, 
indicator for zero NIH funding of major associates, and for minor associates. Columns 3 and 4 include own reim-
bursement rates and the control variable. Point estimates using 1,000 simulation draws. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses. Optimization and estimation details described in online Appendix B.
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reported in the table, the typical rural program is less preferred to urban programs 
because rural programs tend to be associated with smaller hospitals and medical 
school affiliates with lower NIH funding.
Estimates from both specifications also suggest that residents prefer programs in 
their state of birth or in the same state as their medical school. For instance, estimates 
from Specification (2) imply that a typical resident is willing to forgo about $10,000 
in salary to match at a program in the same state as their medical school. These esti-
mates are perhaps too large an estimate for moving costs alone. It may therefore be 
preferable to interpret these estimates as descriptive of a resident’s desire to remain 
close to a significant other, friends and family, or due to initial sorting based on 
geographic preferences during admission into medical school. Although rural-born 
residents prefer rural programs more than other residents, they prefer rural programs 
at an estimated salary equivalent of under $1,200. The estimated willingness to pay 
for these factors is smaller in Specification (1) although the relative importance for 
the different dimensions is similar.
Turning to panel B of Table 7, all specifications yield similar coefficients on the 
various resident characteristics and estimate that the unobservable determinants of 
human capital have larger variances for residents with foreign degrees. The esti-
mated difference between a US-born foreign medical graduate and foreign graduates 
from other countries is an order of magnitude smaller than the standard deviation of 
unobservable determinants of human capital.
Estimates Using Salary Instruments.—As compared to estimates from 
Specifications (1) and (2), which treat salaries as exogenous, the estimated will-
ingness to pay for program characteristics are generally larger in Specifications (3) 
and (4). The estimate for NIH funding of major medical school affiliates is the only 
exception. This increase in the estimated willingness to pay on including the instru-
ment is driven by a fall in the coefficient on salaries but similar coefficient estimates 
for the other program characteristics. The estimates using salary instruments are 
also quite imprecise, as indicated by the typically larger standard errors. Point esti-
mates in Specification (4) are particularly large and imprecise. The reason is that the 
specification results in a small, positive coefficient on salaries that is not statistically 
significant. The magnitudes of the instrumented specifications should be interpreted 
with caution given the lack of robustness, which is likely a consequence of the lim-
ited salary variation in the data.26
Across specifications, however, the qualitative effect of including the salary 
instrument on parameter estimates is an increase in the point estimate in willing-
ness to pay for program characteristics. This suggests that salaries are likely posi-
tively correlated with program unobservables and Specifications (1) and (2) likely 
underestimate the willingness to pay for more desirable programs. As discussed 
earlier, the direction of the bias in the estimates could not be determined based on 
 theoretical arguments. The positive correlation between program unobservables and 
26 The objective function for specifications using salary instruments is fairly flat along different combinations 
of coefficients on the salary and control variable. This indicates that the instrument may be weak. As Stock, Wright, 
and Yogo (2002) point out, the first stage diagnostics and computationally feasible weak-instrument robust infer-
ence methods are not well developed for nonlinear estimation techniques. 
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salaries could result from higher quality programs being more productive or better 
funded.
The lower estimated willingness to pay in Specifications (1) and (2), as we 
will see, will result in conservative estimates of the implicit tuition. My preferred 
approach is therefore to focus on Specification (2), which has the richest form of 
heterogeneity, for the counterfactual results and discuss the effect of the positive 
bias in the salary coefficient using the instrumented specifications. This approach 
may provide a reasonable approximation to the implicit tuition because, aside for 
controlled geographic covariates such as rent and wage index, estimates in column 
1 of Table 6 do not show strong evidence of substantial correlation of salaries with 
program characteristics. Additionally, panels A1 and A2 indicate that in most cases 
a 95 percent confidence interval from the instrumented specification includes the 
point estimate from the corresponding specification that treats salaries as exogenous.
B. Model Fit and Sensitivity
In this section, I describe the in-sample and out-of-sample fit of estimates from 
Specification (2). The fit of the other specifications is qualitatively similar. The 
 out-of-sample fit uses data from the 2011–2012 wave of the GME census, which 
was only accessed after parameter estimates were computed.
Estimates of the model only determine the probability that a resident with a 
given observable characteristic matches with a program with certain observables. 
The uncertainty in matches arises from unobservables of both the residents and the 
programs. Therefore, an assessment of fit must use statistics that average matches 
across groups of residents or programs.
For simplicity, I assess model fit using a single dimensional average quality of 
matched program for a group of residents with a similar observable component of 
human capital. I use the parameter estimates from the model to construct a quality 
index for each resident  i and program  j by computing  x i   α ˆ and  z jt   β ˆ , respectively. 
For each year  t , I then divide the residents into ten bins based on  x i   α ˆ and com-
pute the mean quality of program with which residents from each bin are matched. 
Figure 1 presents a binned scatter plot of this mean quality of program as observed 
in the data and predicted by model simulations. Both the in-sample points and the 
 out-of-sample points are close to the 45-degree line. The 90 percent confidence sets 
of the simulated means for several resident bins include the theoretical prediction.27 
This fit of the model provides confidence that parametric restrictions on the model 
are not leading to poor predictions of the sorting patterns in the market.
Additionally, one may be concerned about model misspecification due to idiosyn-
cratic match-specific factors that are not included or due to violations from pairwise 
stability resulting from incomplete interviewing. Online Appendix B1 examines 
whether such misspecification are likely to result in large biases in the preference 
estimates using Monte Carlo simulations that vary the degree of misspecification. 
For the counterfactual considered in this paper, bias in the estimated preferences of 
residents may be particularly problematic. It appears that the estimates of resident 
27 A more model-free assessment of fit using sorting regressions only on observed covariates is presented in 
online Appendix Table D.2. 
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preferences are not very sensitive to moderate levels of deviations from the assump-
tions made in the framework.
VII. Salary Competition
In 2002, a group of former residents filed a class-action lawsuit under the Sherman 
Act against the NRMP, alleging that the medical match is a competitive restraint 
used to depress salaries.28 By replacing a traditional market in which residents could 
use multiple offers to negotiate with programs, they argued that the NRMP “enabled 
employers to obtain resident physicians without such a bidding war, thereby artifi-
cially fixing, depressing, standardizing and stabilizing  compensation and other terms 
of employment below competitive levels.” A brief prepared by Orley Ashenfelter 
on behalf of the plaintiffs argued that competitive outcomes in this market would 
yield salaries close to the marginal product of labor, which the brief approximated 
using salaries of starting physicians, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants.29 
28 Jung et al. v. AAMC et al. Class Action Complaint, No. 02-CV-00873, D.D.C. (May 5, 2002) states that “The 
NRMP matching program has the purpose and effect of depressing, standardizing and stabilizing compensation 
and other terms of employment.” The lawsuit was dismissed, overturning a previous opinion, following a provision 
in the Pension Funding and Equity Act of 2004 that disallowed evidence of participation in the medical match in 
antitrust cases. 
29 The expert report argues that these markets “are similar to the market for residents but operate without the 
anti-competitive conduct alleged against the Defendants.” A redacted copy of the report is available on request. 
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Figure 1. Model Fit: Simulated versus Observed Match Quality by Resident Bins
Notes: This scatter plot uses model estimates from specification (2) to first obtain predicted qual-
ity on observable dimensions of the residents and of the programs. Quality for the program is the 
“vertical component”  z j β for the programs. The residents were binned into 10 categories, start-
ing with foreign graduates, US-born foreign graduates, and Osteopathic graduates, and 7 quan-
tile bins for MD graduates. The 7 MD bins are approximately equally sized, except for point 
masses at the  cutoffs. An observation is defined at the bin-year level. Simulated means using the 
observed distribution of agent characteristics and 100 simulations of the unobserved characteris-
tics. The 90 percent confidence set is constructed from these simulations.
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Physician assistants earned a median salary of $86,000 in 201030 as compared to 
about $47,000 earned by medical residents despite longer work hours.
Recent research has debated whether low salaries observed in this market are a 
result of the match. Using a stylized model, Bulow and Levin (2006) argue that sal-
aries may be depressed in the match because residency programs face the risk that a 
higher salary may not necessarily result in matching with a better resident. Kojima 
(2007) uses an example to show that this result is not robust in a  many-to-one match-
ing setting because of cross-subsidization across residents in a program. Empirical 
evidence in Niederle and Roth (2003, 2009) suggests that medical fellowship sal-
aries are not affected by the presence of a match. However, these studies do not 
explain why salaries remain low in decentralized markets, or lower than those paid 
to other health professionals.
The plaintiffs argued their case based on the classical economic model of homo-
geneous firms competing for labor in a market with free entry. However, this per-
fect competition benchmark may be misleading for an entry-level professional 
labor market. The data provide strong evidence that residents have preferences for 
program characteristics other than the salaries and may, thus, reject a higher sal-
ary offer from a less desirable program. Further, barriers to entry by residency 
programs and capacity constraints are imposed by accreditation requirements.31 A 
program must consider the option value of hiring a substitute resident when con-
fronted with a competing salary offer. High quality programs may be particularly 
able to find other residents willing to work for low salaries. Conversely, highly 
skilled residents are scarce and they may be able to bargain for higher salaries. It is 
essential to consider these incentives in order to predict outcomes under competi-
tive salary bargaining.
I model a “traditional” market using a competitive equilibrium, which is described 
by worker-firm specific salaries and an assignment such that each worker and firm 
demands precisely the prescribed assignment. Shapley and Shubik (1971) show that 
competitive equilibria correspond to core allocations and satisfy two conditions. 
First, allocations are individually rational for both workers and firms. Second, it 
must be that at the going salaries no worker-firm pair would prefer to break the allo-
cation to form a (different) match at renegotiated salaries. This latter requirement 
ensures that further negotiations cannot be mutually beneficial. Kelso and Crawford 
(1982) show that competitive equilibria can result from a salary adjustment process 
in which the salaries of residents with multiple offers are sequentially increased 
until the market clears. The process embodies the “bidding war” plaintiffs suggest 
would arise in a “traditional” market. In fact, Crawford (2008) proposed redesigning 
the residency match based on this process in response to the lawsuit.
I first develop a stylized model to illustrate the dependence of competitive equi-
librium salaries on both the willingness to pay for programs and the production tech-
nology of residency programs. For counterfactual simulations, I adopt an approach 
that does not rely on knowing the production technology of resident-program pairs 
30 Source: Bureau of Labor Studies. 
31 The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education places minimum standards on physical capital 
dedicated to a residency program, faculty and program personnel, hours dedicated to patient care, and diversity of 
patient population. Further, residency programs may not hire more residents than approved by the accreditation 
body. 
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because data on residency program output is not available. To quantify departures 
from the perfect competition benchmark, I use estimates of the resident preference 
distribution to compute the implicit tuition, which is a conservative estimate of the 
markdown from output net of training costs.
A. An Illustrative Assignment Model
I generalize the model of the residency market in Bulow and Levin (2006) which 
assumes that residents take the highest salary offer by allowing resident preferences 
to depend on program quality in addition to salaries and using a more flexible pro-
duction function.
Consider an economy with  N residents and programs in which each program may 
hire only one resident. Resident  i has a human capital index,  h i ∈ [0,  ∞) , and pro-
gram  j has a quality of training index,  q j ∈ [0,  ∞) . To focus on salary bargaining, 
the training quality at a program is held fixed. Without loss of generality, index the 
residents and programs so that  h i ≥  h i−1 ,  q j ≥  q j−1 , and normalize  q 1 and  h 1 to 
zero.
Residents have homogeneous, quasi-linear preferences for the quality of pro-
gram,  u (q, w) = aq + w with  a ≥ 0 . The value, net of variable training costs, 
to a program of quality  q of employing a resident with human capital index  h is 
 f  (h, q) where  f h ,  f q ,  f hq > 0 and  f  (0, 0) is normalized to  0 . A program’s profit 
from hiring resident  h at salary level  w is  f  (h, q) − w . I assume that an alloca-
tion is individually rational for a resident if  u (q, w) ≥ 0 , and for a program if 
 f  (h, q) − w ≥ 0 .
A competitive equilibrium assignment maximizes total surplus. In this model, 
the unique equilibrium is characterized by positive assortative matching and full 
employment. Hence, in equilibrium, resident  k is matched with program  k and is 
paid a (possibly negative) salary  w k . The vector of equilibrium salaries is determined 
by the individual rationality constraints and incentive constraints that support this 
assignment. There is a range of salaries that are a part of a competitive equilibrium. 
Shapley and Shubik (1971) shows that there exists an equilibrium salary vector 
that is weakly preferred by all residents to all other equilibria, and another that is 
preferred by all programs. Since the plaintiffs alleged that salaries are currently 
much lower than in a “traditional” market, I focus on the worker-optimal equilib-
rium which has higher salaries for every worker than any other equilibrium. This 
outcome is unanimously preferred by all residents to other competitive equilibria, 
and can be solved for in this model:
PROPOSITION 1: The worker optimal competitive equilibrium salaries are given 
by
(14)  w k = −a q k +  ∑ 
i=2
k
 [ f  ( h i,  q i ) − f  ( h i−1 ,  q i ) ]   .
PROOF:
Corollary to the equilibrium characterization in Proposition E.1 (online 
Appen dix E1). ∎
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Resident  1 receives her product of labor  f  ( h 1 ,  q 1 ) (normalized to  0 ), the maximum 
her employer is willing to pay. For resident  2 , the first term  −a q 2 represents an 
implicit price for the difference in the value of training received by her compared to 
that of program  1 (with  q 1 = 0 ). If a resident were to use a salary offer of  w by pro-
gram  1 in a negotiation with program  2 , the resident would accept a counter-offer of 
w − a q 2 . The second term in resident 2’s salary,  f  ( h  2 ,  q 2 ) − f  ( h 1 ,  q 2 ) , is program  2 ’s 
maximum willingness to pay for the difference in productivity of residents  1 and  2 , 
which accrues entirely to the resident in the worker-optimal equilibrium. The sum of 
these two terms measures the impact of the outside option of each party on the salary 
negotiation determining  w 2 . For  k > 2 , these (local) differences in the productivity 
of residents add up across lower matches to form the equilibrium salary.
B. Implicit Tuition
In models of general training that use a perfect competition framework, such as 
Rosen (1972) and Becker (1975), the implicit price for training is the marginal cost 
of training alone because free entry prevents firms from earning rents due to their 
quality. When entry barriers are large due to fixed costs or restrictions from accred-
itation requirements (see footnote 31), firms can earn additional profits due to their 
quality. Ruling out entry also allows us to focus on the role of salary inflexibility. 
Equation (14) shows that under these assumptions, program  k can levy the implicit 
tuition  a q k on residents.32 This implicit tuition results from a force similar to com-
pensating differentials (Rosen 1987), while allowing for heterogeneity in resident 
skill. Equilibrium salaries are the sum of the implicit tuition and a split of the value 
f produced by a resident-program pair.
As mentioned earlier, the data does not allow us to determine  f but the implicit 
tuition can be calculated using residents’ preference distribution alone. The next 
result shows that the implicit tuition bounds the markdown in salaries from below, 
implying that a gap between  f and equilibrium salaries exists as a result of market 
fundamentals. Under free entry by firms, salaries would be equal to  f because any 
profits earned by firms would be competed away.
PROPOSITION 2: For all production functions  f with  f h ,   f q ,   f hq ≥ 0 , the profit of 
firm  k is bounded below by the implicit tuition  a q k in any competitive equilibrium.
PROOF:
Corollary to Theorem E.3 stated and proved in online Appendix E2. ∎
Hence, the implicit tuition  a q k is a markdown in salaries that is independent of 
the output. If residents have a strong preference for program quality, this implicit 
tuition will be large and salaries in any competitive equilibrium will be well below 
the product  f  ( h k ,  q k ) .
32 The term  f  (h, q) can be viewed as output net of training costs. Note that the implicit price  a q k does not depend 
on the number of residents and programs  N , which could be very large, or on the distribution of program quality. 
The important difference from perfect competition is that the number of firms is not disproportionately larger than 
the number of workers. 
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To build intuition, consider two particular limiting cases for the production func-
tion. If  f  (h, q) depends only on  h so that the value of a resident, denoted  f ̅ (h) , does 
not vary across programs, the worker-optimal salaries are given by
(15)  w k =  f ̅ ( h k ) − a q k  . 
Under this production function, the resident claims the value of her labor and sala-
ries equal her product net of the implicit tuition. Residents can engage programs in 
a bidding war until their salary equals the output less the implicit tuition because all 
programs value resident  k equally.
On the other hand, if  f  (h, q) depends only on  q so that all residents produce 
 f _  (q) irrespective of their human capital, the worker-optimal salaries are
(16)  w k = −a q k  . 
In this case, programs do not share the product  f _  ( q k ) with residents since any 
two  residents are equally productive. The resident still pays an implicit tuition for 
training.33
While the production function directly influences competitive salaries, 
Proposition 2 shows that in all cases resident  k pays the implicit tuition  a q k . Equations 
(15) and (16) highlight that the side of the market that owns the factor determining 
differences in  f is compensated for their productivity. Residents are compensated for 
their skill if human capital is an important determinant of  f . For this reason, using a 
production function of the form  f ̅ (h) results in a markdown in salaries from  f that is 
only due to the implicit tuition.
The key difference from the results derived using models with free entry is 
because firms enter and bid for labor services until a zero profit condition is met. 
Hence, compensation close to marginal productivity of labor results from free entry 
rather than negotiations between a fixed set of agents.
C. Generalizing the Implicit Tuition
The expression for the implicit tuition derived above relied on the assumption that 
residents have homogeneous preferences for program quality and do not directly 
speak to competitive outcomes in a model with heterogeneous preferences. This 
section generalizes the definition of implicit tuition to make it applicable to the 
estimated model.
Notice that the profit earned by program  k in a worker-optimal equilibrium under 
a production function of the form  f  (h) is precisely the implicit tuition  a q k because 
this production function does not provide programs with infra-marginal produc-
tive rents. Under this production function, markdowns from output are determined 
only by residents’ preferences for programs. Consequently, calculating firm profits 
using a production function of this form provides a conservative approach to esti-
mating payoffs to programs. The next result shows that even under heterogeneous 
33 To ensure assortative matching in these limiting cases, I assume that a program (resident) with equally attrac-
tive offers breaks the tie in favor of the resident (program) with the higher human capital (quality). 
1973AgArwAl: An EmpiricAl modEl of thE mEdicAl mAtchVol. 105 no. 7
 preferences for programs, the difference between salaries and output is the same for 
all production functions of the form  f  (h) , circumventing the need for estimating  f .
I state the result for a one-to-one assignment model, and the general result for 
many-to-one setting is stated and proved in online Appendix E3.34 With a slight 
abuse of notation, let the total surplus from the pair  (i,  j) be  a ij f =  u ij + f  ( h i ) ≥ 0. 
35 The equilibrium for a modified assignment game in which the surplus produced 
by the pair is  a ij  f ̃  =  u ij +  f ̃ ( h i ) ≥ 0 can be characterized terms of the equilibria of 
the game with surplus  a ij f as follows:
PROPOSITION 3: The equilibrium assignments of the games defined by  a ij f and 
a ij  f ̃  coincide. Further, if  u i f and  v j f are equilibrium payoffs for the surplus  a ij f, then 
u i  f ̃  =  u i f +  f ̃ ( h i) − f  ( h i) and  v j  f ̃  =  v j f are equilibrium payoffs under the surplus 
a ij f. Hence, a firm’s profit in a worker-optimal equilibrium depends on  { u ij } i, j but is 
identical across production functions of the form  f  (h) .
PROOF:
See online Appendix E3 for the proof of the general case with many-to-one 
matches. ∎
As in the illustrative model, under a production technology that depends only on 
human capital, the residents are the residual claimants of output. A change in the 
productivity of human capital is reflected in the salaries, one for one. The firms’ 
profits depends only on the preferences of the residents. Thus, I refer to the differ-
ence between output and salaries in the worker-optimal competitive equilibrium for 
a model in which  f depends only on  h as the implicit tuition. This definition uses 
the assumption that preferences of the programs can be represented using a single 
human capital index in the empirical model but also makes the additional restriction 
that the productivity of human capital, in dollar terms, does not depend on the iden-
tity of the program.
Since a closed form expression for competitive equilibrium salaries is not avail-
able with heterogeneous resident preference, I calculate the implicit tuition implied 
by estimated preferences using a two-step procedure.36 Each step solves a linear 
program based on the approach developed in Shapley and Shubik (1971):
•   Step  1: Solve the optimal assignment problem, modified from the formulation 
by Shapley and Shubik (1971) to allow for many-to-one matching.
34 In the general formulation, I assume that the total output from a team of residents  ( h 1 , … ,  h  q j  ) is 
 F ( h 1 , … ,  h   q j  ) =  ∑ k=1  q j  f  ( h   k ) , where  f  ( h k ) = 0 if position  k is not filled. 
35 This formulation implicitly assumes that, at every program, it is individually rational for a worker to accept a 
salary equal to her product. It further assumes that the output of every resident is nonnegative. 
36 Since the total number of positions in the market exceeds the number of residents and the value of options out-
side the residency market are difficult to determine, I assume that the equilibrium is characterized by full employ-
ment. This property follows if, for instance, it is individually rational for all residents to be matched with their least 
desirable program at a salary equal to the value of the resident to this program. 
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•   Step  2: Calculate the worker-optimal element in the core given the assignments 
above.
Online Appendix E4 describes the procedure in more detail. All calculations are 
done with the 2010–2011 sample of the data.
D. Estimates of Implicit Tuition
Estimates presented in Section VI suggest that residents are willing to take large 
salary cuts in order to train at preferred programs, which can translate into a large 
implicit tuition. Table 8 presents summary statistics of the distribution of implicit 
tuition using estimates from various specifications. I estimate the average implicit 
tuition to be about $23,000 for Specifications (1) and (2). As mentioned in Section 
VI, the results from Specifications (3) and (4) indicate that salaries are positively 
correlated with program unobservables. We therefore expect larger estimates of the 
implicit tuition with these specifications, but ones that are imprecise since the instru-
ment appears weak. Specification (3) yields an estimated average implicit tuition of 
$43,500 but with a larger standard error of $13,700. Nonetheless, this specification 
rules out an average implicit tuition smaller than $17,000. These estimates are eco-
nomically large in comparison to the mean salary of about $47,000 paid to residents. 
Specification (4) results in a still larger point estimate of $120,000. The standard 
error cannot be computed for this specification because the coefficient on salary was 
not significantly different from zero.37 Given that the salaries in the data range from 
about $31,000 to $65,000, these calculations, particularly those with Specification 
(4), involve significant parametric extrapolations on resident choices.
The results also show significant dispersion in the implicit tuition across residents 
and programs. The standard deviation in the implicit tuition from Specifications 
(1)–(3) is between $12,000 and $25,000. The seventy-fifth percentile of implicit 
tuition can be about three times higher than the twenty-fifth percentile, with even 
higher values at the ninety-fifth percentile. This dispersion arises from the differ-
ences in program quality, which allows higher quality programs to lower salaries 
more than relatively low quality programs.
The average estimated implicit tuition is upward of 50 percent of the $40,000 
salary difference between medical residents and physician assistants. This finding 
refutes the plaintiffs’ argument that the salary gap would not exist if residents’ sala-
ries were set competitively and physician assistant salaries approximated the produc-
tivity of residents. However, the lower end of the estimates cannot explain the salary 
gap between starting physicians and medical residents, which is  approximately 
$90,000.38 As discussed earlier, the implicit tuition is a conservative estimate of 
37 I used a simulation approach to compute the standard errors because a delta method using finite difference 
derivatives is computationally prohibitive as an estimate for each simulation involves solving a large linear program. 
To assess whether a one-sided confidence interval using Specification (4) rules out small estimates of the average 
implicit tuition, I simulated the distribution of the estimated average implicit tuition by truncating the asymptotic 
distribution of the salary coefficient below at 0.01 (the point estimate is 0.498 and the standard error is 0.317). This 
truncation should affect the right tail of the estimates, but not the lower end of the estimates. The estimated one-
sided 95 percent confidence interval places a lower bound of $39,631 on the average implicit tuition. 
38 I use Mincer equation estimated using interval regressions on confidential data from the Health Physician 
Tracking Survey of 2008 to calculate the average salaries for starting family physicians. Details available on request. 
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the salary markdown and part of this salary gap may be due to differences in the 
productivity of medical residents and starting physicians.
One can also interpret the implicit tuition as a bound on the markdown from 
the marginal productivity if the medical residency market were to adopt the flexi-
ble-salary match proposed by Crawford (2008) since the suggestion is intended to 
implement competitive equilibrium outcomes. The results suggest that a large gap 
between salaries and productivity would still remain even if salaries were flexible 
and set competitively.
VIII. Conclusion
While preferences of agents determine outcomes in matching markets, a com-
mon constraint is that only data on employer-employee matches or student enroll-
ment records, rather than stated preferences, are available. This paper develops 
an empirical framework for estimating the distribution of preferences of agents 
in large  two-sided markets with non-transferable utility using only data on final 
matches. I use pairwise stability together with a vertical preference restriction on 
one side of the market to estimate preference parameters using simulated mini-
mum distance. The empirical strategy is based on using moments from the sort-
ing patterns observed in the data and information available only in a market with 
 many-to-one matching.
I use these methods to quantitatively analyze whether centralization in the med-
ical residency market is responsible for low salaries. I find that heterogeneity in 
program types and capacity constraints result in quantitatively large departures from 
the perfect competition model suggested by the plaintiffs in the lawsuit. Theoretical 
Table 8—Implicit Tuition
 
Geographic
heterogeneity
(1)
 
Full
heterogeneity
(2)
Geographic  
heterogeneity  
with instrument  
(3)
Full  
heterogeneity  
with instrument
(4)
Mean $22,625.38 $23,753.54 $43,470.39 $119,622.30
(3,498.41) (5,461.19) (13,678.08) —
Median $21,166.40 $21,194.27 $40,606.85 $107,689.70
(3,266.20) (4,985.89) (12,847.51) —
Standard deviation $12,279.77 $16,651.24 $24,792.30 $80,400.55
(1,779.57) (3,932.44) (7,485.20) —
Fifth percentile $5,160.78 $2,737.88 $7,912.03 $14,480.97
(1,449.57) (982.41) (3,246.19) —
Twenty-fifth percentile $14,069.19 $11,618.22 $24,853.10 $58,470.95
(2,365.88) (2,780.80) (8,299.05) —
Seventy-fifth percentile $28,901.58 $31,439.99 $58,354.66 $162,742.00
(4,352.64) (6,991.71) (18,134.03) —
Ninety-fifth percentile $45,784.76 $55,165.06 $92,343.91 $273,583.30
(6,921.96) (1,2591.74) (2,8071.67) —
Notes: Based on 100 simulation draws. For columns 1–3, each simulation draws a parameter from a normal with 
mean  θ ̂SMD and variance  Σ ̂ , where  Σ ̂ is estimated as described in Section IIB. Column 4 is computed at  θ ̂SMD . All 
columns simulate the unobservables  ξ jt ,  ε i , and  β i and use the 2010 sample of residents and programs. Standard 
errors in parentheses.
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results presented in Section VII show that equilibrium salaries can be well below 
the product of labor (net of training costs) when residents value the quality of a 
program. Counterfactual estimates show that the willingness to pay for programs 
results in salary markdowns (implicit tuition) upward of $23,000 in any competitive 
equilibrium. My estimates also show that higher quality programs would earn a 
larger implicit tuition than less desirable programs. To the extent that higher quality 
programs are matched with higher skilled residents, the implicit tuition is a coun-
tervailing force to high dispersion salaries driven by productivity differences. The 
implicit tuition may therefore explain the empirical observations of Niederle and 
Roth (2003, 2009) in fellowship markets.
The result suggests that the limited supply of heterogeneous residency positions, 
due to barriers to entry such as accreditation requirements, can cause significant 
salary depression, and weighs against the view the match is primarily responsible 
for low resident salaries. In this market, salaries may also be influenced by the pre-
viously mentioned guideline requiring minimum financial compensations for resi-
dents. These forces are not directly linked to the presence of a match.
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